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Abstract
Programs that certify the environmental (or other social) attributes of firms are common.
But the proliferation of labeling schemes makes it difficult for consumers to know what each
one means – what level of ‘greenness’ does a particular label imply? We provide the first model
in which consumers can expend effort to learn what labels mean. The relationship between
information acquisition costs, firm pricing decisions, the market shares obtained by alternatively-
labeled goods and a brown ‘backstop’ good, and total environmental impact prove complex.
Consumer informedness can have perverse implications. In plausible cases a reduction in the
cost of information damages environmental outcomes. Our results challenge the presumption
that provision of environmental information to the public is necessarily good for welfare or the
environment.
Keywords: Eco-labeling, green consumerism, information-based instruments.
JEL codes: D83, L15, L31, Q52.
1 Introduction
Environmental labeling schemes – certifying the performance of firms on a variety of environmental
measures – have proliferated in recent years.1 A number of analyses have sought to characterize
the positive and normative implications of such certification (e.g., Mason, 2011; van’t Veld and
Kotchen, 2011; Fischer and Lyon, 2014; Heyes and Martin, 2017; Li and van’t Veld, 2015; Ben
Youssef and Abderrazak, 2009). The central assumptions of such analyses are (a) that there exist
‘green’ consumers – that at least a subset of consumers are willing to pay a premium for product
with a lower environmental footprint – and (b) that those consumers understand what a particular
label implies about the environmental performance of the supplying firm.
There is plenty of evidence to support the existence of green consumers and we do not dwell
on that here.2 Our focus is on the second assumption – that consumers know what labels mean.
First, to challenge its validity, second to show that a number of retained beliefs about the role of
labels in competitive market settings are not robust to its relaxation.
If labels are to be effective they need to impact consumers’ purchasing decisions. This in
turn requires the recognition and comprehension of the label that a good displays, or fails to
display. Much of the debate surrounding this point in practitioner circles has been on the ability
of consumers to recognize and understand labels adequately. Consumer confusion about labels has
been exacerbated as the number of overlapping labeling programs has proliferated, but as far back
as 2002 the OECD (2002, p. 4) expressed concern over the growing number of eco-labels and the
likelihood of consumer overload. The implications for trade have been echoed more recently in Prag
et al (2015). This has not, however, been reflected in established economic models of certification,
which assume that if a good carries a label then the representative consumer is able to (a) see, (b)
recognize, and (c) understand the label, and adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly.3
The real world is very different – given how crowded the certification space is, this is hardly
surprising. Consider Figure 1, which brings together a small sample of the green labels that
might face an average North American consumer on a typical shopping trip. Even among a highly
informed readership – such as reviewers of research about green labels at a leading academic journal
– comprehension of the qualifying requirements for each label is likely to be fuzzy at best. While
it is self-evident that the OK Power label refers in some way to energy use, what exactly does it
imply? And how much better in that dimension is a product carrying such a label to an identical-
1While we will talk about environmental labels it should be clear that the analysis applies to certification of a
much wider set of otherwise difficult to discern social attributes (child labor and other labor practices, fairness of
trade, etc.).
2See Roe et al. (2001), Teisl et al. (2002), Bjørner et al. (2004), Elfenbein and McManus (2010).
3The same applies to the small number of other models that are not explicitly about labeling but the provision of
information about credence attributes of goods in conventional models of vertical quality differentiation (Cremer and
Thisse (1999); Lerner and Tirole (2006); Farhi et al (2013)). There is a small experimental literature that attempts
to get to grips with how consumers might interpret labeling claims. Cason and Gangadharan (2002), for example,
find that cheap talk claims can sometimes generate a willingness to pay premium. Ippolito and Mathios (1990) also
consider issues of how consumers interpret attribute information in the context of health claims on cereal packaging.
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Figure 1: A sample of popular environmental labels.
looking one that does not? Or to one that carries the GreenPower label? Or one that carries the
(perhaps) broader-based Planet Positive label?
Unsurprisingly, consumers are confused. This has been discussed in RESOLVE (2012), a forum
that bought together leading researchers, business people, certifiers and policy experts in the area.
The title of a 2014 article by the Guardian Newspaper in the UK decried “the ‘Wild West’ of eco-
labels: sustainability claims are confusing consumers” (The Guardian, 4 July 2014). In referring
to a 2013 Eurobarometer report, EU Environment Commissioner Janez Potocˇnik commented that
“Of course we all want to see more green products on shelves, but this survey shows that most of
us are confused by green claims. . . [t]hat’s not good for consumers, and it is not rewarding those
companies that are really making an effort.” (European Commission, 2013).
A number of studies have sought to measure consumer recognition of various eco-labels. In
1996, 80% of West Germans and 56% of East Germans could recognize and name the Blue Label
(OECD, 1997). In Denmark, 31% of respondents referred to the Nordic organic food label unaided,
substantially higher than in other Nordic countries (Sweden 16%, Finland 5%). The unaided recall
of the European Union’s ‘Flower’ label was less than 2% in Sweden, though 18% in the Netherlands
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(Palm and Jarlboro, 1999).4 Recognizing a label is not, of course, the same as understanding what
it implies. In the United States, a 2014 survey by the Consumers Union revealed that 74% of
respondents believed that the label ‘organic’ on the good implied that the product did not contain
artificial ingredients (untrue), while 55% believed the same label applied to meat meant the animal
spent at least some of its time outdoors (again, untrue) (Consumer Report, 2014). van Dam and
Reuvekamp (1995) test Dutch consumers’ interpretation of the labels that they had recognized.
The fraction that they categorized as having an ‘adequate’ or better understanding of what the
award of a label implied varied from 9% to 91%, depending on the label in question.
We develop a simple model that focuses on the competition between firms whose products carry
distinct green labels. Those labels imply different levels of environmental performance – one ‘high’,
one ‘low’ – but both strictly cleaner than a backstop ‘brown’ technology that is also available.5
Key to our analysis is that consumers are assumed to not know, at least initially, which label
matches up to what level of environmental performance. Our model’s central innovation lies in the
explicit attention paid to providing plausible micro-foundations for the process whereby consumers
acquire and interpret information about the meaning of a particular label—consumers are not
passive here. As such our analysis complements other models of labels. In Brecard (2014) and
Brecard (2017) competing products carry labels that are observationally distinct but consumers
proceed on the assumption that the stringency of labeling criteria are equal across label types, even
though they are not. In the model of consumer confusion by Harbaugh et al. (2011) consumers do
not actively seek out information about the meaning of labels but update beliefs based on passive
observation of the actions of others.6
In our model information acquisition is treated as an individual investment and the willingness
of a consumer to incur the cost of becoming informed is determined endogenously.7 The strategic
choices facing firms are rendered more complex because they now have to market their products
to a population of consumers that vary not just in the extent to which they are willing to pay a
premium for products with green labels but also in their knowledge of what different labels mean.
We acknowledge here the possibility that price may act as a signal of quality (following Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), Bagwell and Riordan (1991)). However, in order to focus on the novelty of the
paper – the active acquisition of costly information by consumers – we ‘muﬄe’ the role of prices
in signaling quality. We assume that consumers will interpret a higher priced good to be of higher
quality than a lower priced alternative, but only if the price differential is significantly large. In
terms of inference about quality, small price differences will be ignored.
4Recognizing a label when shown is not of course the same thing as unaided recall. Proactive rather than responsive
awareness of existence may imply that a consumer is able to note the absence of a particular label on a product and
update her evaluation of that product accordingly.
5We ignore here the possibility of fraudulent labels while acknowledging the potential importance of such fraud in
some settings. Papers that study fraud include Hamilton and Zilberman (2006).
6Our model also speaks to policy implications associated with public provision of information about labels’ mean-
ing, whereas Harbaugh et al. (2011) focus more on the managerial implications of consumer confusion.
7Uninformed consumers here are not the same as the myopic unaware consumers in Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
but simply those who have not made the costly expenditure to learn the true meaning of the labels in question.
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The model captures in a stylized way insights from marketing about how consumers respond
to labels.8 While existing models have dealt with issues of trust (e.g., Mahenc, 2016), fraud (e.g.,
Hamilton and Zilberman, 2006), selective disclosure (e.g., Lizzeri, 1999), and consumer confusion
(e.g., Harbaugh et al., 2011), ours is the first model to allow consumers an active role in information
acquisition, consistent with insights from marketing.9 The structure of our model generates insights
that have been overlooked in existing analysis on the role of information provision in environmental
policy (through labels, disclosure requirements and other information-based programs). Informed
consumers impose externalities—which can be positive or negative—on other consumers (informed
and uninformed), on firms and on aggregate environmental outcomes.10 Each time a consumer
becomes informed, it affects the strategic pricing game played between firms carrying competing
label types.
The paper contributes to the emerging literature on green labels, in particular that part of the
literature which allows for competition among labels (these include Heyes and Martin (2016), Li and
van’t Veld (2015), Fischer and Lyon (2014)). It also articulates with some of the wider literature
on quality disclosure (for example Board (2009), Fishman et al (2003) and Grossman (2003) –
Dranove and Jin (2010) provide a survey) and with that on information acquisition by consumers.
While space here precludes a survey of the latter, Kihlstrom (1974) is an early example of a model
in which consumers can acquire costly information about product quality, while Caplin and Dean
(2015) build a model of ‘rational inattention’ in which agents optimally trade-off uninformedness
against the cost of information acquisition.
In Section 2 we present the model and characterize its solution treating the cost of information
acquisition as exogenous. In Section 3 we pay explicit attention to the role of that cost and
investigate how varying it impacts aggregate environmental damage. In general the sign of that
relationship is qualitatively ambiguous, and negative in plausible circumstances – information about
what competing labels mean being more cheaply available could cause total environmental damage
to be higher. This has non-standard implications for how we might think about public programs
designed to reduce the difficulty of accessing such information. Section 4 concludes.
8Thøgersen (2002) provides a useful overview of the role that labels can play in influencing consumer behavior
from a marketing perspective. An eco-label is regarded as an innovation in itself and “. . . innovation adoption theory
describes the decision to buy such a product as a learning process, consisting of a number of successive phases, where
the consumer obtains, accumulates, and integrates knowledge about the product and evaluates its self-relevance”.
He notes that the effort required on the part of consumers during this process: “. . . consumers have to go through
an often time-consuming decision making process through which they first become aware of the label, and of labeled
products, and then acquire sufficient knowledge to use it as a guide in decision making and to trust the message it
conveys” (Thøgersen, 2002, p. 96).
9While not about labeling, Kennedy et al. (1994) examine the role of information provision and corrective taxes
when consumers are imperfectly informed about the environmental footprint of a good.
10This interaction between firms and consumers also sets our analysis apart from, for example, Sallee (2014) where
rational inattention is modeled in a pure discrete-choice framework.
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2 Model
We study an industry in which firms differ in the environmental standards to which they adhere
and use eco-labels to certify their green credentials. For simplicity we assume three levels of
environmental standards and two labels that are observationally distinct – with, say, different
legends or logos. A label may denote high environmental stringency sh or low stringency sl, with
sh > sl > 0. Consumers do not know (at least, initially) which label represents high standards
and which denotes low standards. Products sold without an eco-label are known to be ‘brown’,
normalized here as embodying the lowest environmental standard s0 = 0.
11
Consumers are willing to pay for the greenness of products, but to different degrees. There is
a continuum of consumers, each with unit demand for the good, deriving utility
u(s, p) = θs− p,
from paying price p for a good with environmental quality s. Here θ is a parameter that captures
a consumer’s willingness to pay for environmental quality, or simply their ‘green premium’. We
assume θ is distributed uniformly in an interval [θ, θ], where θ > 0, and θ = θ + 1. We make the
following assumptions on parameters.
Assumption 1 (A1). Consumers differ sufficiently in their green premium so that θ ≥ 2θ.
Assumption 2 (A2). Consumers attach sufficient value to environmental quality so that θ > sh−sl2sl .
Assumption 1 says that there is sufficient heterogeneity in consumer tastes – the willingness
to pay for the green attribute at the top end is at least double what it is at the bottom – and is
standard in models of vertical product differentiation (as in Tirole (1988, p. 296)). If we regard the
ratio (θ/θ) as a measure of the heterogeneity of consumer preferences, the assumption puts a lower
bound on this heterogeneity. Note, in passing, that given θ = θ + 1, the assumption also implies
θ ≤ 1.
Assumption 2 requires that we restrict attention to contexts in which consumers care ‘enough’
about the environment. If the consumers as a population attach very little or no weight to the
environmental attribute then certification will have not traction. In particular by putting a lower
bound on the willingness to pay for quality it ensures that all consumers will find it worthwhile to
buy a labeled products for at least some configuration of prices.
Together Assumptions 1 and 2 imply restrictions on parameters. Let s¯ = 0.5(sh+sl) denote the
average environmental quality of labeled products. Let σ = (sh− sl) denote the difference between
11Labels of different stringency can come about from differences in certifiers’ objectives (Fischer and Lyon, 2014).
We do not model the process whereby certifiers design the stringency of their labels, rather we take stringency as
given. A certifier can perfectly observe a firm’s environmental performance, so that there can be no ‘false-positives’
or ‘false-negatives’ associated with certification. A firm cannot be awarded a label unless it meets the stringency
demanded by the label (e.g., Fischer and Lyon, 2014; Heyes and Martin, 2017).
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the quality levels of the high-label and low-label goods. It is easy to see that the two Assumptions 1
and 2 imply that s¯ > σ.12 In other words, the difference in quality levels is less than their average.
Conventional analyses of vertically-differentiated firms focus on firms’ competition in prices. In
the simplest settings, there are two quality standards, say sh and sl. Consumers are assumed to
know the quality offered by each firm, and buy from the firm that provides greater utility for any
configuration of prices. The two firms compete for consumers, choosing positive prices ph and pl
to maximize their profits.
In contrast, our model has three firms, associated with the three levels of environmental quality.
Two firms carry distinct green labels that denote either a high environmental standard sh or low
standard sl. The third sells an unlabeled or brown alternative which embodies no environmental
enhancement (that is, embodying quality s0 = 0). For expositional simplicity we assume that
the marginal cost of production is zero, regardless of environmental quality. This is appealing
analytically since it implies that nothing in our results will be driven by differences in firm costs.13
Given consumer preferences, products that are unlabeled will sell only at a zero price. The firm
supplying this brown product provides a backstop to consumers – the default dirty variant of the
product to which the consumer reverts if none of the labeled alternatives succeed in attracting her
custom.14
Our model make two other assumptions that depart from the conventional setting. First,
consumers may lack the knowledge to match the two labels to their environmental stringency.
Specifically, while the stringency levels sh and sl are common knowledge, consumers may not know
which type of label is associated with stringency level sl and which with sh. This is the essence
of consumers’ potential confusion over labels. Our model will develop the possibility that some
consumers might make costly effort to learn what labels mean.
Second, we assume that firms make their pricing decisions sequentially, with the high quality
firm acting as leader in the price-setting game, and the low quality firm moving second. When
making their choices consumers observe only the configuration of prices, not the sequence in which
they were chosen, so are not able to infer quality from the sequence of pricing decisions.
To fix ideas we begin with the benchmark case with perfect information where all consumers
are informed about the meaning of labels. We will then turn to the case where consumers are
uninformed, to examine the role of learning.
12Recall that Assumption 1 restricts θ ≤ 1, so the second assumption implies sh− sl < 2sl. Adding sh− sl to both
sides we get 2σ < sh + sl, which implies σ < s¯.
13It also makes the the mapping from environmental outcomes to welfare outcomes straight-forward – when a con-
sumer buys a cleaner good that is good for the environment, but at the same time good for welfare. For completeness,
in the Appendix we explore the formulation with positive and heterogeneous marginal costs.
14The supplier of the brown good is not modeled as an active player here. It supplies however as much of the
backstop product as is demanded at price zero and makes zero profits. This role can equally be thought of as being
played by a competitive fringe of many small sellers of unimproved products.
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2.1 Labels with perfect information
Suppose consumers are fully informed. In other words they can match labels to their true environ-
mental quality and so know the true characteristics of each product on offer.
We model the interaction among the two labeled firms and consumers as a game, with the
following sequence of moves.
1. The high quality firm chooses a price ph.
2. The low quality firm observes ph and chooses pl in response.
3. Consumers make their purchasing decisions, picking the firm that gives them higher utility
net of price.
The analysis here is straightforward. Consumers choose to buy from the firm that provides
greater utility, θsh − ph if they buy from the firm with high environmental standard, or θsl − pl if
they buy from the firm with low standard. Consumers whose utility is negative for both labeled
firms at the posted prices fall back on the unlabeled product whose price is zero. The Appendix
shows that
Proposition 1. With perfect information about the quality represented by labels, equilibrium prices
are given by
p∗h =
(
2θ − θ
2
)
σ (1)
p∗l =
(
2θ − 3θ
4
)
σ. (2)
It is apparent (and expected) that p∗h > p
∗
l : the firm whose product carries the high-quality label
sets a higher price. An interval of consumers with high willingness to pay for the environmental
attribute buy the product bearing the high label, while those with lower willingness to pay buy the
product bearing the low label.
At these equilibrium prices, quantities sold by the two labeled firms are
q∗h =
(
2θ − θ
4
)
(3)
q∗l =
(
2θ − 3θ
4
)
. (4)
It is easy to check that the market is completely ‘covered’ by the two labeled firms: that is, each
consumer buys from one of the two firms with labels, so q∗h + q
∗
l = 1.
15 The unlabeled firm’s sales
15The market is completely covered by labeled products as long as p∗l ≤ θsl. Here p∗l =
(
2θ−3θ
4
)
σ =
(
2−θ
4
)
σ, so
complete market coverage requires θ ≥ 2σ
σ+4sl
. This holds from Assumption 2, which sets θ ≥ σ
2sl
.
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are q∗0 = 0.
The associated profits of the firms with labeled products are
pi∗h =
1
2
(
2θ − θ
2
)2
σ (5)
pi∗l =
(
2θ − 3θ
4
)2
σ. (6)
In equilibrium the prices set by the firms imply that the high quality firm ends with greater share
of the market and higher profits. As is standard for vertically-differentiated markets, equilibrium
prices and profits are increasing in σ, the absolute difference between the values of the differentiating
characteristic.16
2.2 Imperfect information and labels
We now study the interaction between firms under imperfect information. Specifically, while the
two labels are observationally distinct, a consumer (initially at least) cannot tell which is which –
which corresponds to the high level of environmental performance and which the low.
Consumers may choose to discover the meaning of labels by incurring costly effort. This may
take the form of seeking out literature or visiting websites that carry information about the stan-
dards met to achieve the certification each label represents.
The extent of which any individual will be willing to become informed can be expected to depend
upon: (1) the cost of information, in terms of the opportunity cost of time spent on research or the
pecuniary cost in terms of subscription fees;17 (2) the extent to which they value the environmental
attribute, and therefore the benefit to them of sorting out the characteristics of a product carrying
one sort of label from another.
This second consideration is worth dwelling on in more detail. Depending upon what prices
the consumer expects to see when they go to market, it may or may not be in the interest of
a particular environmentally-conscious consumer to invest in disentangling the label types. This
could be because even if the consumer knew which was which, prices are such that he would in any
case opt for the brown/unlabeled backstop. But, more subtly, some consumers may be better off
simply choosing a product carrying a label – any label – and accepting that there is a 50/50 chance
it is either high or low.
16Intuitively, price competition is more intense when product differentiation is low, eroding profits. In the limit
the outcome converges to one of Bertrand competition, with zero profits.
17Policy interventions may be able to alter this costs: labeling authorities and others could lower this cost (for
example, make websites easier to find and the information therein more accessible for a lay person to understand).
NGOs and/or governments may adopt public education programs aimed at raising awareness of environmental im-
pacts. See, for example, Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) for a model where an activist can provide information about
the operating practices of a firm. As a real world example, the non-profit consumers’ group ConsumerUnion runs the
greenerchoices.org website that catalogs eco-labels and describes what a compliant firm must do to be awarded the
label, with the goal of informing consumers.
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We examine pricing decisions of firms when information is imperfect, and examine how these
decisions vary with the cost of that information. Our previous setting is augmented as follows.
1. The two labels are observationally distinct (they “look” different) but consumers do not
initially know which implies sh and which implies sl. Each consumer can discover this by
incurring cost k > 0. The parameter k is common to all consumers and is common knowl-
edge. Learning is perfect and private: consumers who incur cost learn the meaning of labels
perfectly, but cannot communicate this finding to other consumers who choose to remain
uninformed.
2. Firms set prices, with the high quality firm moving first, the low quality firm second.
3. Consumers use directly acquired information and, possibly, observed prices, to form beliefs
about labels. Each consumer makes his purchasing decision based on these beliefs.
Information acquisition and beliefs
We start by analyzing the incentives for consumers to acquire information given prices expected to
emerge in the subsequent pricing game as given.
Learning is costly but consumers are willing to incur this cost if it enables a better choice.
The value of information lies in the extent to which it will improve a consumer’s selection between
products.
To fix ideas, begin with the case where both labeled firms charge the same price, p > 0. If
a consumer is unable to distinguish between the stringency of the two labels, a randomly-picked
labeled product embodies expected quality s¯ = 0.5(sh + sl). Buying a labeled product at random,
then, yields expected utility θs¯− p to a consumer of type θ. Incurring cost k allows this consumer
to discover the meaning of the two labels, guiding the choice towards the higher quality product,
with enhanced utility θsh − p. If he anticipates that good carrying the distinct labels will sell at a
common price p, a consumer will choose to become informed if and only if the informational gain
exceeds the cost of being informed: that is, if
θ(sh − s¯) ≥ k,
or, equivalently, if θ ≥ 2kσ . It is evident that a consumer with a high green premium θ has a greater
incentive to acquire information.
We introduce a minor adjustment in notation to aid our exposition. While k represents the
direct cost of acquiring information, the denominator σ is a measure of the value of that infor-
mation. When σ = sh − sl is relatively small, the difference in the quality levels is low, implying
lower informational gain. Higher values of σ amount to more valuable information. For sharper
interpretation and to limit notation we define κ = k/σ as the value-adjusted cost of information -
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in effect the cost per unit of information. As σ is a fixed parameter in our model, this is a simple
normalization.
In terms of κ, therefore, if both labeled firms sell at a common price p only consumers with
θ > 2κ will choose to acquire information. If information is sufficiently costly (i.e., if κ > 12θ), no
consumer will find it worthwhile to acquire information; if it is sufficiently cheap (if κ < 12θ), all
will become informed. For intermediate values of κ, the proportion who will choose to be informed
is given as
α(κ) = θ − 2κ. (7)
Next consider configurations in which the two labeled firms charge different prices. Here we
allow the possibility that even consumers who have not invested directly in information acquisition
may form beliefs about the quality of labels based on observed prices.
We endow the consumers with relatively simple beliefs, on the rough heuristic that if firms
charge different prices, the firm with the higher price is likely to represent higher quality, in the
tradition of Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and subsequent literature.
If so, the configuration of prices affects the interaction among firms through two channels: prices
may affect beliefs about quality, but they also allocate demand between the two firms given any
set of beliefs about quality. This introduces a potential fragility in the strategic interaction if small
differences in prices can, by altering perceptions of quality, lead to large re-allocations of demand.
To avoid this we build some ‘friction’ into the market by positing that consumers interpret a higher
price as signaling quality only when prices differ by some non-trivial amount, ∆ > 0.18 Any price
differential smaller than ∆ is ignored by consumers in forming their beliefs about quality. That
agents are boundedly rational in this sense is close in spirit to, for example, the notion of ‘just
noticeable differences’ (see Dziewulski (2016) for a review). Methodologically, without ruling out
the possibility that firms could signal quality through prices it restricts it – an epsilon of price
difference is not permitted to fully inform the whole consumer population. This allows us to
focus on active information acquisition by consumers - the channel of interest to us – rather than
consumers as passive recipients of information, which has already been well-studied both in the
wider literature, and also the eco-label literature (for example Harbaugh et al (2011)). A fuller
analysis could combine the two more fully, at the cost of substantial additional complexity.
To make this precise we specify consumers’ beliefs, common for all consumers, as follows. Let
µ0i be the prior probability that the firm i has the more stringent label sh (and, by inference,
that firm j’s label, distinct from that of firm i, has lower stringency sl). With observationally
identical firms, it is rational to posit that the prior µ0i = 1/2. Consumers who invest to acquire
information learn the meaning of each label directly and perfectly: depending on what they learn,
their posterior beliefs are given by either µi = 1 or µi = 0. For consumers who do not invest in
18We assume ∆ is bounded away from zero, but small enough so that the price differential associated with the
full-information case is revealing: specifically that 0 < ∆ < p∗h − p∗l , as given in equations (1) and (2).
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acquiring information posterior beliefs are
µi =

1 if pi > pj + ∆,
0 if pi < pj −∆,
1/2 otherwise.
Together {µ0i , µi} capture the evolution of beliefs regarding firm i’s label.
We now consider the price-setting game between firms contingent on a fraction α(κ) of con-
sumers being directly informed about label meanings. As before, the firm with the more stringent
label sh leads in setting prices. We consider two scenarios: one in which the firm with the low
standard chooses to match the leader’s price ph, and the other in which it chooses to diverge from
it.
Market shares and profits under price matching
Consider, first, configurations in which the low quality firm chooses to match ph, the price set by
the high-quality firm. Consumers who are directly informed, namely those with θ ∈ [2κ, θ], would
prefer to buy from the known high-quality firm, provided only that θs¯h − ph ≥ 0; at a low enough
price ph all directly informed consumers – with mass [θ − 2κ] – form a ‘captive’ market for the
high-quality firm.
Consumers who have not invested in information, those with θ ∈ [θ, 2κ), cannot distinguish
between the two labeled firms when prices are identical. They know that one of the products
embodies environmental attribute at level sh and one at sl but do not know which is which. As
such they will regard either labeled option as delivering average level of environmental attribute,
s¯ = 0.5(sh + sl). The demand of consumers of this type is distributed equally between the two
labeled firms as long as θs¯ − ph ≥ 0. Consumer with relatively low θ, who would obtain negative
utility if they bought a labeled product at that prevailing price, prefer to go for the brown backstop
(which recall delivers zero of the environmental attribute but at price zero).
Demand for the high-quality firm is
qh(ph) =

θ − phsh if ph > 2κsh,
θ − 2κ if 2κsh ≥ ph > 2κs¯[
θ − 2κ]+ 12 [2κ− phs¯ ] if 2κs¯ > ph > θs¯
At a sufficiently high price ph only a subset of directly-informed consumers buy the high-
label product. For an intermediate range, all informed consumers buy from it but no uninformed
customer does (they all prefer the unlabeled backstop). For prices low enough, it sells to all the
directly-informed consumers and also gets half of the demand from uninformed consumers who are
11
willing to pay ph for a ‘blind’ pick among the labeled alternatives.
19
On matching price ph demand for the low quality firm is
ql(ph) =
0 if ph > 2κs¯,1
2
[
2κ− phs¯
]
if 2κs¯ ≥ ph > θs¯
When ph is sufficiently large relative to κ, the high-label product ‘pre-empts’ the market, squeez-
ing out all demand for the low quality firm. At lower prices, it attracts half the pool of uninformed
consumers who are willing to buy a labeled product at price ph.
Consider now the profit-maximizing choice of price by the firm selling the high-label product,
ph. It is easy to show that when information is sufficiently cheap (if κ ≤ θ3) it is optimal for the
high-quality firm to serve only (a subset of) informed consumers; if matching that price, the low
quality firm has no demand.
For θ3 < κ <
θ
2 , the high quality firm’s optimal price pˆ
∗
h, under the expectation that its price
will be matched, is
pˆ∗h(κ) =
[
θ − κ] s¯. (8)
Importantly, this profit-maximizing price is decreasing in κ. The intuition is that if information
is relatively expensive for consumers to acquire then, other things equal, the set of informed con-
sumers (in whose eyes the two labeled products are differentiated) will be smaller, and the share
of consumers in whose eyes the two labeled products are undifferentiated larger. Price competition
for the latter group is more intense for the usual reasons, driving down price.
At this optimally-chosen price, market shares for the two labeled firms are
qˆ∗h(κ) =
1
2
[
θ − κ] , (9)
and
qˆ∗l (κ) =
1
2
[
3κ− θ] . (10)
Higher κ reduces the market share of the high quality firm as its captive market is eroded, but
allows greater space in the market for the low quality firm. The associated profits are then
pˆi∗h(κ) =
1
2
[
θ − κ]2 s¯. (11)
and
pˆi∗l (κ) =
1
2
[
3κ− θ] [θ − κ] s¯. (12)
Consider the impact of information cost κ on profits for the two labeled firms. The high quality
19For brevity we ignore the case where ph ≤ θs¯. It is easy to verify that prices this low will not obtain in equilibrium.
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firm’s profit is decreasing in κ in this range [13θ,
1
2θ]: more costly information induces a lower price
and shrinks its market share. On the other hand, as long as the low quality firm chooses to match
the leader’s price, its profits are strictly increasing this range. At the lowest end of this range, when
κ = θ3 , the low quality firm is entirely preempted and its profit is zero. At the upper end, its profit
is 18θ
2
s¯.
For values of κ > 12θ, information is so costly that no consumer find it worthwhile to acquire
information. The market for labeled goods is shared equally between the two firms, with each
earning half the joint monopoly profits. The optimal price is 12θs¯, with each firm selling
1
4θ with
profits 18θ
2
s¯.
It is also useful, for later purposes, to assess the impact of κ on aggregate sales for firms with
labeled products. Higher values of κ reduce the sales of the high-quality product but increase sales
of the low-quality by a larger amount. Under price matching, aggregate sales of the two labeled
firms are
qˆ∗h(κ) + qˆ
∗
l (κ) = κ (13)
for κ ∈ [13θ, 12θ], and are θ2 for higher values of κ. Importantly, in this setting the market is not
covered by the two labeled firms. An interval of consumers choose the brown or backstop product
that bears neither label. Sales of unlabeled products are
qˆ∗0(ph) =
1− κ if κ ∈
(
θ
3 ,
θ
2
)
,
1− 12θ if κ ≥ θ2
(14)
To summarize, the market for unlabeled products is (weakly) decreasing in κ.
Departures from price matching
When the firm selling the low-label product ‘mimics’ the high-label firm by matching its price
it attracts half of the uninformed consumers who buy a labeled item, but none of the informed
consumers. But price matching is not necessarily the best strategy for the low quality firm. In
this section we consider situations in which the equilibrium is characterized by the low-label and
high-label variants being sold at different prices.
For values of κ equal to or below 13θ, the low quality firm’s profit from matching price, pˆi
∗
l (κ), is
zero. In this range, the low quality firm could do better by charging a price lower than ph. Given
how consumers’ beliefs react to significant price differentials (say, for prices pl < pˆ
∗
h −∆), a lower
price might reveal its low quality, but would leave it free to charge price low enough to mop up
demand from consumers with low willingness to pay for the environmental attribute.
Of course, once the meaning of the firms’ labels is revealed through prices to all consumers, the
outcome reverts to the full-information case discussed earlier, with firms’ optimized profits given
as pi∗h and pi
∗
l in equations (5) and (6).
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3θ
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2θ
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κ∗
pi∗h
pi∗l
pˆi∗h(κ)
pˆi∗l (κ)
Figure 2: Firms’ profits over various ranges of κ.
More generally, it might be profitable for the low quality firm to deviate from price matching
whenever pi∗l > pˆi
∗
l (κ). To identify the range of information cost for which this holds define κ
∗ such
that pˆi∗l (κ
∗) ≡ pi∗l . Does such κ∗ exist? Writing out these expressions, we have
1
2
[
3κ∗ − θ] [θ − κ∗] s¯ ≡ (2θ − 3θ
4
)2
σ. (15)
At κ = 13θ, we have pˆi
∗
l (k) = 0, so that the expression on the left is strictly less than that on
the right, pi∗l . Further, pˆi
∗
l (k) is continuous and strictly increasing in κ in the interval (
1
3θ,
1
2θ). A
sufficient condition, then, for the existence of a critical κ∗ in this interval is that pˆi∗l (κ) > pi
∗
l for
κ = 12θ. To appreciate the plausibility of the last restriction, note that when firms coordinate their
prices through price matching, their profits vary directly with average quality s¯. On the other
hand, when firms compete in prices, profits vary with σ, the absolute difference in quality levels.
We require only that s¯ be sufficiently large relative to σ. In what follows, we make the following
additional assumption.
Assumption 3 (A3). We have s¯ > 4σ.
This Assumption provides a sufficient condition such that for high enough information cost κ
both firms will find the price matching regime to be more profitable that the relatively intense price
competition under full information. To see this, note that for κ ≥ 12θ profits profits under price
matching equal 18θ
2
s¯ for either firm. It is easy to check that under Assumption 3, this is strictly
larger that profits pi∗h and pi
∗
l as described in equations (5) and (6).
Figure 2 captures these profits for various ranges of information cost under Assumption 3. For
the low-quality firm profits are (weakly) increasing in κ. For κ ≥ κ∗, they exceed the profits it earns
in the full-information case. In contrast, for the high-quality firm profits are (weakly) decreasing
in κ and, given Assumption 3, exceed the profits it earns under full-information.
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2.3 Firms’ pricing decisions under imperfect information
We now collate our analysis to identify price equilibria for various ranges of information cost κ.
Definition 1 (Price Equilibrium). Given κ, a price equilibrium is given by the following elements.
• Each consumer chooses whether or not to acquire information about the meaning of labels and
subsequently decides from which firm to buy given beliefs and preferences.
• Firms choose prices sequentially to maximize profits, first ph for the high quality firm and
then pl for the low quality firm, given consumer beliefs.
• Beliefs depend on acquired information and observed prices, as already described.
We identify two categories of price equilibria.
The first category entails a pooling equilibrium in which firms choose a common price p. A
fraction of consumers – those with the highest willingness to pay for the green attribute – choose
to become informed about the meaning of the labels and buy only from the high quality firm.
Consumers with the lowest willingness to pay will not acquire information and will eschew both
labeled options in favor of the cheaper brown backstop. However in the middle we have an interval
of consumers who care enough about the environment to buy a labeled product, but not enough
about the marginal additional greenness implied by the high- over the low-label to invest in the
costly information that they would need to allow them to distinguish which was which.
The second category is a separating equilibrium in which firms choose different prices, with
ph > pl. Given the information structure, the price difference across firms is large enough to be
completely revealing to all consumers. Outcomes in such an equilibrium revert to those described
for the full information case in Section 2.1
The type of equilibrium that obtains depends upon κ; in particular on its value relative to
critical threshold κ∗.
Proposition 2. (Separating equilibrium) For κ < κ∗ a separating equilibrium obtains, with the
outcome as described in the full information case.
The Appendix provides a proof, but the intuition is plain to see. When information acquisition
costs are relatively low, a large fraction of consumers chooses to become informed about labels. It
is preferable then for the low quality-firm to choose pl < pˆ
∗
h rather than match that price. For ∆
small enough, the price differential is fully revealing regardless of fraction α(κ) of consumers that
had chosen to be directly informed. With full information, the optimal prices are p∗h and p
∗
l , with
profits pi∗l and pi
∗
h. The outcome is fully specified in equations (1) to (6).
Proposition 3. (Pooling equilibrium) A pooling equilibrium exists for κ ≥ κ∗.
15
When information about labels is relatively costly, only a small fraction of consumers choose
to become informed. In that setting, the low quality firm finds it relatively profitable to match the
high quality firm’s price, sharing the demand from uninformed customers who choose to buy labeled
products. Choosing a lower price (to attract customers on price) as the intense price competition
associated with that setting leads to lower profits. It could charge a higher price to pretend that it
is high quality but when the price premium ∆ required to sway beliefs is large enough, this strategy
does not increase profits. As Figure 2 shows, for the high quality firm, profits are always higher if
the low quality firm chooses to match its prices.
3 Information Provision and Environmental Protection
We now turn to the question of how aggregate environmental outcomes vary with consumers’ cost
of becoming informed about the true meaning of competing labels.
Calls for more spending on public information and awareness campaigns – which in terms of
our model would manifest as reductions in κ – are often heard in this context (see, for example,
OECD (1997)). Existing models of green labels have either assumed perfect comprehension of
labels by consumers or, in a small number of cases, been populated by sophisticated consumers
who are passive learners. As such, and notwithstanding their many merits, they are ill-equipped for
the task of understanding how information campaigns influence the active information-gathering
efforts of individual consumers.20
Our interest lies in the overall environmental damage that obtains under various configurations.
Since firms differ in their environmental standards, the overall environmental impact of the industry
depends on the distribution of consumer demand across the firms. That is not just the division of
demand within the labeled sector of the market (since different labels imply different environmental
footprints), but also between the labeled and unlabeled sectors.
Let z denote the damage per unit of production using the backstop or brown technology (that
sold without a label). Labels certify adherence to environmental standards that lower this damage.
For the firm with the high-quality label the per unit damage is z − sh, and for the low quality
firm it is z − sl for the low. Plausibly, we assume that z > sh such that even for the cleanest firm
imposes some damage.
Aggregate environmental damage depends upon the divisions of output across firms, qh and ql
20We use ‘information campaign’ here to refer to efforts by government, NGOs, or others to decrease k, the cost
of information for consumers. The onus will continue to be on individual consumers to inform themselves about a
label, but the information program can reduce the cost of that information acquisition. This is consistent with the
careful empirical analysis of Ippolito and Mathios (1990) in the context of health labels on food. They conclude
that “analysis of individual food consumption data indicates that theories of information acquisition are important
in explaining who responds most quickly to new information; household and individual characteristics that reflect
costs of acquiring information, ability to process information, and valuation of health are all important determinants
of fiber cereal choices. Moreover, the evidence suggests that advertising reduced. . . the costs of acquiring information
for broad segments of the population” (page 459).
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for the firms selling labeled products, and q0 for the unlabeled backstop.
Z(qh, ql, q0) = qh(z − sh) + ql(z − sl) + q0z.
Below we evaluate aggregate environmental damage in the various settings analyzed earlier, and
ask how this varies with the cost of gathering information.
Total environmental damage
At the separating equilibrium, output levels for the firms are given as in the full information case,
with q∗h and q
∗
l given by equations (3) and (4). In this case the market is covered by firms with
labels, so that q∗0, the amount sold of the brown unlabeled backstop is zero. Total environmental
damage is
Z∗ = q∗h(z − sh) + q∗l (z − sl)
= z − [q∗hsh + q∗l sl]
(16)
The term in square brackets measures the total damage reduction associated with sales of the
labeled goods against a benchmark in which all good were produced using the unimproved brown
technology.
For those values of κ for which a pooling equilibrium obtains – informed customers buy from
the firm with the high quality label, and some uninformed customers nonetheless go on to buy one
of the labeled variants. Crucially, the market is not covered completely by two firms with labels with
some customers falling back on the brown product. Aggregate environmental damage is
Zˆ(κ) = qˆ∗h(κ)(z − sh) + qˆ∗l (κ)(z − sl) + [1− qˆ∗h(κ)− qˆ∗l (κ)]z
= z − [qˆ∗h(κ)sh + qˆ∗l (κ)sl]
(17)
Some results follow. First, total environmental damage is higher at outcomes characterized by
pooling equilibria relative to those at separating equilibria. This is due to two effects: (a) the
market share of the high-label product is greater in the separating equilibrium relative to that at
the pooling equilibrium,21 and (b) the market is completely covered by labeled firms, avoiding any
market share for the brown backstop.
The second, relates to the impact of variations in κ under pooling. Using values from equations
21We have q∗h =
(
2θ−θ
4
)
and qˆ∗h(κ) =
1
2
(
θ − κ). We can check that q∗h > qˆ∗h(κ) for any κ that involves learning.
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Figure 3: Firms’ outputs over various ranges of κ.
(9) and (10) for qˆ∗h(κ) and qˆ
∗
l (κ) in the interval [κ
∗, 12θ], we can write
Zˆ(κ) = z −
[
1
2
(θ − κ)sh + 1
2
(3κ− θ)sl
]
= z − 1
2
θσ − (s¯− σ)κ
(18)
Recall that Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that s¯ > σ. Under those assumptions environ-
mental damage under pooling equilibrium Zˆ(κ) is decreasing in κ > κ∗ in the range [κ∗, 12θ].
At first glance this result is surprising: more costly information can result in greater environ-
mental protection (or, conversely, easier access to information about the meaning of labels results
in higher environmental damage). Why does information hurt? Lower κ, by improving access to
information, boosts the part of the market ‘captive’ to the high quality firm (those consumers who
have acquired information, such that if they buy a good with a label it will be the one with the
high-label). This reduces the intensity of price competition between the sellers of the alternatively-
labeled goods, and induces the price of a good carrying either label to rise in the pooling equilibrium.
These higher prices encourage consumers with a lower willingness to pay for the green attribute
to turn their backs on the labeled options altogether and revert to the cheaper, unlabeled brown
alternative. While the migration of consumers within the labeled sector from the low-label to the
high-label supplier implies less environmental damage, this is more than offset by the increase in
damage as the part of the market covered by unlabeled goods is widens.
Figure 3 captures how the market shares of the three firms vary with κ. Pooling equilibria
obtain for k > κ∗. Within the interval [κ∗, 12θ], a reduction in κ induces a rise in the market share
of the hight quality label, but also increases the share (shaded in the figure) of unlabeled product.
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Figure 4: Aggregate environmental damage as a function of κ.
Figure 4 shows how aggregate environmental damage varies with the cost of information. In-
terestingly, aggregate environmental damage is non-monotonic in κ, with a distinct range of of
information costs where environmental damage is decreasing in κ. This points out that attempts
to improve access to information may have mixed results. When the improvement in information
is strong enough to tip the equilibrium outcome from one that involves a pooling equilibrium to a
separating equilibrium, it improves the environmental outcome. But there is the possibility that
smaller improvements may make environmental outcome worse.
We summarize this as the Proposition below.
Proposition 4. Total environmental damage is non-monotonic in the cost of information κ.
4 Conclusions
There is a large body of evidence to say that (a) many or most consumers do not recognize eco-
labels and (b) even those who do tend not to be very good at understanding what they mean.
A robust model of eco-labels requires the process whereby consumers come to comprehend the
message contained in labels. This is missing from existing analyses which assume that labels, when
applied, are universally understood.
The model we develop takes explicit account of the learning incentives facing consumers – con-
sumers are active players in the model, not passive. They have the opportunity to inform themselves
about the meaning of labels that they observe, but only do so if they anticipate that the benefits
justify the costs. The accessibility of information is something that government and/or NGOs can
influence through educational campaigns. The fraction of consumers that understand a particular
label is determined endogenously in the model and it affects how firms price their products. Build-
ing the process of active information acquisition into a model with otherwise standard features
turns out to impact things significantly in a variety of ways. The model complements the work of
Harbaugh et al (2011), Brecard (2014, 2017) and others who have explored the role of eco-labels in
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settings in which consumer comprehension of their meaning is less than complete.
We use the framework to contemplate the role played by information campaigns in such a model.
Public education programs are modeled as reducing the cost that individuals have to bear to acquire
information about a label. One would naturally think that the more the public knows about the
labels, the better. However, we establish that this is not necessarily the case—environmental
benefit from labeling can decrease as consumers become more informed about labels’ meaning. If
information is sufficient accessible (i.e., not too costly to obtain), the firm bearing the low quality
label will wish to compete on price, attracting custom away from the firm with the high quality
label. Our model develops the notion of an “efficient amount of misinformation”; it is not in general
optimal to have information about labels freely available.
The mechanism underpinning the seemingly perverse relationship between costliness of infor-
mation and overall aggregate outcomes is worth reviewing and relies on a careful consideration of
how we think about market coverage.
As we have shown, in the pooling equilibrium the market coverage of labeled products is less than
full, with some consumers – an interval at the lower end of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP)
buying the brown backstop.22 While those consumers with the highest WTP for the environmental
attribute will find it worthwhile to acquire the information that they need to allow them to pick a
good carrying the high-label in particular, there is an interesting interval of consumers with mid-
range WTPs who are motivated enough to buy “a labeled product” over the brown backstop, but
not so motivated that they would invest in becoming informed to ensure they can pick “the best”
among the labeled alternatives. This latter group remain uninformed, know that there is a half
chance that the labeled product they buy embodies sh and a half chance sl, and buy that lottery.
Critical to understanding how the cost of information impacts the overall environmental foot-
print of the sector is how the interval of WTP values covered by that middle set varies with changes
in that cost. An increase in the cost of information affects both the lower and upper boundary
of that interval, but in ways that have different environmental implication. At the upper end it
discourages some acquisition of information, and causes some of those who previously became in-
formed in order to buy the high-label product in particular, to decide that is no longer worthwhile.
At this margin those consumers now fall into the middle group - they revert to buying “a labeled
product”. This is bad for the environment since some part of demand within the labeled segment of
the market is reallocated from the firm selling high-label products to one selling low-. However, as
the portion of consumers in the labeled part of the market who are informed goes down, the closer
competition between the alternatively-labeled good comes to competition in undifferentiated prod-
ucts.23 Reduced differentiation intensifies competition between the two labeled goods and drives
22The situations in which the pooling outcome prevails are the most interesting. As we have shown, under separation
the outcomes reverts to the full-information case, the market is covered by labeled goods and aggregate environmental
impact is invariant to the cost of information acquisition.
23Recall again, the labels are observationally-distinct. They may be different colors, carry different logos or legends,
etc.. However if consumers do not know which physical manifestation corresponds to sh and which to sl then in terms
of the dimension that matters the goods are undifferentiated. Each offers the buyer a 50/50 lottery over the two
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down prices of both. As this happens an interval of those who previously would have gone for the
brown backstop good are induced not to acquire information, but to opt into the middle group who
buy “a labeled product”. This is good for the environment. Our analysis shows that over part of
a range of κ the first effect on the environment outweighs the second, elsewhere that is reversed.
The model would predict real world outcomes in which a premium would be paid for a product
carrying one of a set of available labels, compared to a totally uncertified alternative, but with at
the same time little or no variation in the size of premium amongst labels.24
There are two interesting implications of the model relating to NGO run labels and the recent
proliferation of such labels and the ensuing confusion for consumers (see Harbaugh et al. (2011);
Fischer and Lyon (2014); Heyes and Martin (2017) for a discussion of label proliferation). First,
having multiple labels with only a fraction of consumers informed about labels’ meaning can pro-
duce a better environmental outcome than having a single universally-understood label, counter to
popular discussion. When consumers are only imperfectly informed about the meaning of labels
but can exert effort to learn, proliferation of labels can be desirable, and necessary for this to be the
case is that there be consumer confusion in equilibrium. Second, NGOs operating labeling schemes
and interested in improving the environment may wish to deliberately make information about
their labels less than perfectly accessible. In this way, the NGOs can induce greater environmental
benefits from the firms they certify.
attribute values.
24The internal conversation that a consumer of the middle type in our model is having with themselves might run
as follows: “I see one product carrying a WWF label and one carrying a Greenpeace label. I know either of these
will be much better than the cheaper unlabeled competitor. I also suspect that one of the WWF and Greenpeace are
more stringent in what they require when they hand out labels. However differences are such that it is not worth me
exerting the effort it would take to find out which is which, so I’ll just pick whichever.”
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Firm h has zero demand at any price ph > θsh, so would prefer to choose a
lower price. Firm l, with its visibly lower environmental standard, has zero demand when pl ≥ ph
in this range. It is sufficient, then, to focus on cases with pl < ph ≤ θsh. For any pair of prices
(ph, pl), consumers with θ ≥ ph−plσ prefer to buy from firm h and the rest from firm l. Consider the
low quality firm’s optimal response to the high quality firm’s price ph. Its demand is given by
ql(pl; ph) =

ph−pl
σ − θ if pl ≤ θsl,
ph−pl
σ − plsl otherwise.
Choosing pl to maximize profits plql(pl; ph), its optimal reaction to ph is
Rl(ph) =
12(ph − σθ) if ph ≤ θ(sh + sl),1
2
sl
sh
ph otherwise.
Anticipating this response, the high-quality firm’s demand is
qh(Rl(ph), ph) =

2θ−θ
2 − 12σph if ph ≤ θ(sh + sl),
1
2
sl
sh
ph otherwise.
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, its profit maximizing price lies in the first of the above ranges, with
p∗h =
(
2θ − θ
2
)
σ,
so that
p∗l = Rl(p
∗
h) =
(
2θ − 3θ
4
)
σ.
It is straightforward to determine market shares and profits at these equilibrium prices. From
Assumption 2, we have p∗l < θsl so that
q∗l = ql(p
∗
l ; p
∗
h) =
(
2θ − 3θ
4
)
q∗h = qh(p
∗
l ; p
∗
h) =
(
2θ − θ
4
)
Profits are given by pi∗l = p
∗
l q
∗
l and pi
∗
h = p
∗
hq
∗
h.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given κ, a fraction α(κ) of consumers are willing to invest in acquiring
information. Consider the low quality firm’s pricing decision who, as follower in the price-setting
sequence, must choose whether or not to match the leader’s price. When κ < κ∗, from (15),
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we have pˆil(κ) < pi
∗
l , so the low quality firm would prefer the full-information outcome if it were
attainable. Suppose the high quality firm chooses p∗h, while the low-quality firm chooses p
∗
l . For
∆ small enough, the price differential is fully revealing regardless of fraction α(κ) of consumers
that may choose to be directly informed, so that posterior beliefs are µh = 1 and µl = 0. From
Proposition 1, prices p∗h and p
∗
l are best responses to each other in this full information setting,
with profits pi∗l and pi
∗
h. Consumers with θ ≥ 14(2θ + θ) buy the product with hiqh quality label;
those with lower θ buy the product with the low quality label.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given κ, only consumers with θ ≥ 2κ will invest in acquiring information
directly. Informed consumers will have posterior beliefs µh = 1 and µl = 0, while uninformed
consumers will have posterior beliefs µh = µl = 0.5. From equation (15), for κ ≥ k∗, the proportion
of informed consumers is small enough that low quality firm will prefer to match prices (ie., choose
pl = pˆ
∗
h) rather than choose any lower price that would reveal its low quality. Would this firm ever
find it profitable to choose a price higher than pˆ∗h, in the expectation that choosing a price high
enough to would allow it to signal (falsely) that it is high quality? The gain to the low quality
firm from doing so is limited by the fact that informed customers will persist with the high quality
firm; and even when the size of the captive market is small, it must choosing a price significantly
higher to sway beliefs. It is easy to check that under Assumption 3, its profits are decreasing in
the premium it charges, so the profitability of this deviation is ruled out by assuming that the ∆,
the price premium required to sway beliefs is large enough.
Could the high-quality firm do better by deviating from its chosen price pˆ∗h at the pooling
equilibrium? At the pooling equilibrium its profit is at least 18θ
2
s¯. Optimal profits for this firm
when firms choose distinct prices are at most 18(2θ − θ)2σ. Given Assumption 3 such deviations
from the pooling price are not profitable.
At this equilibrium the pooled price is
pˆ∗h =
[θ − κ]s¯ if κ ≤ 12θ,1
2θs¯ otherwise.
At this price, consumers with relaively high willingness to pay for green products (those with
θ ≥ 2κ) choose to be informed and buy the from the firm they know to be high quality. Those with
relatively low willingness to pay (those with θ < max[(θ − κ), 12θ]) buy the unlabeled product. An
interval of consumers with intermediate values of θ choose to remain uninformed and pick randomly
between the two firms with labeled products.
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Extending the analysis to allow for heterogeneous marginal cost
The model in our paper assumes that marginal cost of production is zero, regardless of quality
of label. This extension allows for positive marginal costs ci that differ across the two firms with
labeled products. We assume ch > cl > 0 for labeled products; and c0, the marginal cost of the
unlabeled product, is set at zero.
We assume θsh > ch: otherwise firm h will have zero demand at any price that covers its
marginal cost.
Full information
We begin with the case where all consumers are fully informed about the quality of labels. Once
again we focus on price configurations with pl < ph ≤ θsh. At any pair of prices (ph, pl), consumers
with θ ≥ ph−plσ prefer to buy from firm h; those with lower θ prefer to buy from firm l or may fall
back on the brown product.
Consider the low quality firm’s optimal response to the high quality firm’s price ph. Its demand
is given by
ql(pl; ph) =

ph−pl
σ − θ if pl ≤ θsl,
ph−pl
σ − plsl otherwise.
Choosing pl to maximize profits (pl − cl)ql(pl; ph), its optimal reaction to ph is
Rl(ph) =
12(ph − σθ + cl) if ph ≤ θ(sh + sl)− cl,1
2(ph
sl
sh
+ cl) otherwise.
Anticipating this response, the high-quality firm’s demand is
qh(Rl(ph), ph) =

2θ−θ
2 − 12σph if ph ≤ θ(sh + sl)− cl,
1
2
sl
sh
ph otherwise.
Its profit maximizing price lies in the first of the above ranges, with
p∗h =
1
2
[
(2θ − θ)σ + (ch + cl)
]
,
so that
p∗l = Rl(p
∗
h) =
1
4
[
(2θ − 3θ)σ + (ch + 3cl)
]
.
The market is covered with labeled products as long as p∗l ≤ θsl. This restriction amounts to
θ ≥ 2σ + (ch + 3cl)
σ + 4sl
.
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With positive ch and cl this assumption is more demanding than Assumption (A2) used in the
paper. Intuitively, positive marginal costs impose a lower bound on prices of labeled products,
which might make it harder to ensure that all consumers buy a labeled product. Those who are
deterred would fall back on the dirty product, sold at a price equal to its marginal cost, zero.
Our purpose is to explore the environmental consequences of reduction in market coverage as
a consequence of informational imperfection. It is useful then to choose parameter configurations
that ensure complete coverage in the full information case. To do so, we assume above inequality
holds.
Assumption 1 (Modified Assumption 1). We have θ ≥ 2σ+(ch+3cl)σ+4sl .
It is straightforward to determine market shares and profits at these equilibrium prices under
this Assumption. The quantities sold by the two labeled firms are
q∗h =
1
4
[
(2θ − θ)− ch − cl
σ
]
(1)
q∗l =
1
4
[
(2θ − 3θ) + ch − cl
σ
]
. (2)
Compare these to the case analyzed in our model, which had equal marginal costs for both labeled
products (and both values set at zero). Relative to that case, the differentially higher marginal cost
for the high quality firm implies that its market share will be smaller and the low quality firm’s
market share be larger. But once again, the Assumption ensures that the market is covered by
labeled products: we have q∗h + q
∗
l = 1.
The associated profits of the firms with labeled products are
pi∗h =
1
8
[
(2θ − θ)− (ch − cl)
σ
]2
σ (3)
pi∗l =
1
16
[
(2θ − 3θ) + (ch − cl)
σ
]2
σ. (4)
Note that in this case, due to its higher marginal cost of production, the high quality firm is not
guaranteed to earn higher profits than the low quality firm. However, if the cost differential is not
too large, profits would indeed be higher for the high quality firm. One restriction that is sufficient
to ensure this: θ > ch−clsh−sl . For simplicity we assume this to hold.
Imperfect information
We now turn to the case with imperfect information. As before, we assume that consumers with
θ ≥ 2κ choose to be informed directly.
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Market shares and profits under price matching
Consider configurations in which the low-quality firm chooses to match ph, the price set by the
high-quality firm. Consumers who are directly informed, namely those with θ ∈ [2κ, θ] prefer to
buy from the known high-quality firm as long as θs¯h− ph ≥ 0; at a low enough price ph all directly
informed consumers form a ‘captive’ market for the high-quality firm. Consumers who have not
invested in information – those with θ ∈ [θ, 2κ) – cannot distinguish between the two labeled firms
and regard either labeled option as delivering average level of environmental attribute, s¯, and their
demand is distributed equally between the two labeled firms as long as θs¯ − ph ≥ 0. Consumer
with relatively low θ, who not not obtain non-negative utility at that prevailing price, prefer to go
for the brown backstop.
Demand for the high-quality firm is
qh(ph) =

θ − phsh if ph > 2κsh,
θ − 2κ if 2κsh ≥ ph > 2κs¯[
θ − 2κ]+ 12 [2κ− phs¯ ] if 2κs¯ > ph > θs¯
If the low quality firm chooses to match this price (that is, set pl = ph) its demand is
ql(ph) =
0 if ph > 2κs¯,1
2
[
2κ− phs¯
]
if 2κs¯ ≥ ph > θs¯
If ph is sufficiently large relative to κ, the high-quality firm pre-empts the market, squeezing out all
demand for the low quality firm. At lower prices, uninformed consumers are shared between the
two labeled firm as long as they are willing to pay the price. We characterize optimal pricing in a
regime of price matching for two cases, depending on the value of κ
Case 1: For θ3 +
1
6
ch
s¯ < κ <
θ
2 , the high quality firm’s optimal price pˆ
∗
h, under the expectation that
its price will be matched, is
pˆ∗h(κ) =
[
θ − κ+ 1
2
ch
s¯
]
s¯. (5)
This profit-maximizing price is decreasing in κ. At this price, market shares for the two labeled
firms are
qˆ∗h(κ) =
1
2
[
θ − κ− 1
2
ch
s¯
]
, (6)
and
qˆ∗l (κ) =
1
2
[
3κ− θ − 1
2
ch
s¯
]
. (7)
Higher κ within this range erodes the market share of the high quality firm, but allows greater
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space in the market for the low quality firm. The associated profits are then
pˆi∗h(κ) =
1
2
[
θ − κ− 1
2
ch
s¯
]2
s¯. (8)
and
pˆi∗l (κ) =
1
2
[
3κ− θ − 1
2
ch
s¯
] [
(θ − κ)s¯+ 1
2
ch − cl
]
. (9)
Consider the impact of information cost κ on profits. The high quality firm’s profit pˆi∗h(κ) is
decreasing in κ in this range. On the other hand, as long as the low quality firm chooses to match
the leader’s price, its profits are strictly increasing this range, provided ch > 1.5cl: we assume this
to be true. At the lowest end of this range, when κ = θ3 +
1
6
ch
s¯ , the low quality firm is preempted
and its profit is zero. At the upper end, its profit is 18 [θ − chs¯ ][θ + chs¯ − 2 cls¯ ]s¯.
Case 2: For values of κ > 12θ, information is so costly that no consumer find it worthwhile to
acquire information. The labeled market is shared equally between the two firms. The optimal price
is 12(θs¯+ ch), with each firm selling
1
4(θ − chs¯ ). Profits for the hiqh-quality firm is pˆi∗h = 18 [θ − chs¯ ]2s¯
and that for the low-quality firm is pˆi∗l =
1
8 [θ − chs¯ ][θ + chs¯ − 2 cls¯ ]s¯. Note here that the low quality
firm is more profitable as it has an equal market share but lower marginal cost.
Market coverage under price matching. We can quantify the impact of κ on aggregate sales for
firms with labeled products. Under price matching, for θ3 +
1
6
ch
s¯ < κ <
θ
2 , aggregate sales of the
two labeled firms are
qˆ∗h(κ) + qˆ
∗
l (κ) = κ−
1
2
ch
s¯
. (10)
For higher values of κ, they equal 12(θ − chs¯ ). Either way, the market is not covered by the two
labeled firms. Sales of unlabeled products are
qˆ∗0(ph) =
1− κ+ 12
ch
s¯ if
θ
3 +
1
6
ch
s¯ < κ <
θ
2 ,
1− 12θ + 12 chs¯ if κ ≥ θ2
(11)
Departures from price matching
For values of κ equal to or below 13θ +
1
6
ch
s¯ , the low quality firm’s profit from matching price,
pˆi∗l (κ), is zero. A significantly lower price might reveal its low quality, but would leave it free to
charge price low enough to mop up demand from consumers with low willingness to pay for the
environmental attribute. Of course, once the meaning of the firms’ labels is revealed through prices
to all consumers, the outcome reverts to the full-information case discussed earlier, with firms’
optimized profits given as pi∗h and pi
∗
l in equations (3) and (4).
More generally, it might be profitable for the low quality firm to deviate from price matching
whenever pi∗l > pˆi
∗
l (κ). To identify the range of information cost for which this holds define κ
∗ such
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that
pˆi∗l (κ
∗) ≡ pi∗l .
Does such κ∗ exist? At κ = 13θ +
1
6
ch
s¯ , we have pˆi
∗
l (k) = 0, so that the expression on the left is
strictly less than that on the right, pi∗l . Further, pˆi
∗
l (k) is continuous and strictly increasing in κ up
to κ = 12θ). A sufficient condition, then, for the existence of a critical κ
∗ in this interval is that
pˆi∗l (κ) > pi
∗
l for κ =
1
2θ. Writing out the expressions.
1
8
[
θ − ch
s¯
] [
θ +
ch − 2cl
s¯
]
s¯ >
1
16
[
(2θ − 3θ) + (ch − cl)
σ
]2
σ
When firms coordinate their prices through price matching, their profits vary directly with average
quality s¯. On the other hand, when firms compete in prices, profits on σ, the absolute difference in
quality levels. We require only that s¯ be sufficiently large relative to σ, large enough for the above
inequality holds.
This essentially replicates the structure of the model, without altering the key mechanism
behind our results. For κ < κ∗ we have separating equilibria; κ ≥ κ∗ pooling equilibria arise. As
is evident, this extension requires some additional notation and further restrictions on parameters
(on ch relative to cl; and on these values relative to sh and sl) but does not alter our qualitative
results.
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